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Should enterprises that received bank loans under socialism
retain  those  liabilities  when  the government  privatizes  them?  Or
should the government take responsibility  for the debts of
formerly  state-owned  enterprises?
Governments  should  seriously  consider  assuming  these
enterprise debts because  of the potentially  great gains in effi-
ciency that will result and the relatively  low fiscal  costs.
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Levine and Scott examine the decision policy-  enterprises, increase government credibility, and
makers in transitional socialist economies must  improving the efficiency of the financial sector.
make: how to define the asset and liability
structure of state-owned enterprises and banks as  Transitional socialist economies have not yet
they are privatized.  privatized major banks. Levine and Scott explain
that privatizing banks will tend to make financial
They conclude that the many loans issued by  intermediation more efficient and speed up the
state-owned banks to state-owned enterprises  economic transition. They contend that govern-
under socialism are impeding the transition to  ments are unlikely to succeed in privatizing
thriving market economies. The heavy stock of  major banks unless the government assumes
debts is slowing the privatization of enterprises  responsibility for a significant part of bank
anci banks, hindering the efficient operation of  claims on enterprises. They argue that the
firms and the financial sector, encouraging ad  operation and restructuring of state-owned banks
hoc government intervention, and reducing  will also be improved if the government assumes
government credibility.  enterprise debts.
In practice, governments often assume  They find that the fi-oal implications of the
enterprise debts to banks on a case-by-case basis  government explicitly assuming enterprise debts
so they can sell enterprises to the private sector.  to state-owned banks are likely to be small.
Levine and Scott argue that a more comprehen-  Governments should seriously consider assum-
sive, explicit application of such a policy would  ing enterprise debts to state-owned banks as they
improve efficiency by depoliticizing and speed-  privatize enterprises because of the potentially
ing up the privatization process, improving the  great gains in efficiency that will ensue and the
viability and profitability of newly privatized  relatively low fiscal costs.
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Rutkowska, and David Gordon significantly shaped this paper.I.  INTRODUCTION
Transitional socialist  economies (TSEu) in Europe do not yet have financial
systems that efficiently allocate resources to new, private sector firms and
assist sufficiently in the privatization and revitalization of existing
enterprises..  Observers increasingly argue that the large stock of loans
issued by banks to enterprises under socialism is impeding the transition of
many countries to thriving market economies by slowing the privatization of
enterprises and banks, hindering the efficient operation of firms and the
financial sector, encouraging ad hoc government intervention, and reducing
government credibility.  In light of these concerns, this paper examines a key
question- how should governments define the asset and liability structure of
enterprises and banks when the government privatizes these entities so as to
maximize efficiency benefits and minimize adjustment costs?
We outline a framework for assessing the benefits and costs of alternative
policy choices regarding the definition of the assets and liabilities of
enterprises and banks.  The criteria we.  use to evaluate alternative policies
includes enterprise and financial sector performance, government credibility,
and fiscal stability.  Using these criteria, we assess two alternative policy
options in detail.  The first option asuumes that the government privatizes
enterprises and banks with historic claims intact, i.e., enterprises that
received bank loans under socialism retain these liabilities when the
government privatizes them.  The second policy option assumes that the
government takes responsibility for enterprise obligations to banks.2
We conclude that in terms of enterprise and financial sector performance and
government credibility, replacing bank claims on enterprises with claims on
the government at the time of privatization offers important advantages.  This
alternative reduces the cost, time and effort required to privatize
enterprises, and enhances the viability and efficiency of newly-privatized
firms.  Furthermore, by explicitly assuming enterprise bank debt, the
government permits the more rapid privatization of state-owned banks and
enhances bank viability and efficiency.  Moreover, government assumption of
enterprise obligations to state-owned banks minimizes pressure for subsequent
1  We focus on TSEs in Central and Eastern Europe.  The unique changes in
Europe imply that the analysis may not be more generally applicable.
2  Although we refer to the government substituting a government bond on
the balance sheet of banks, the government could instead reduce government
claims on banks.2
government  intervention  in  the  newly-privatized  enterprise  and  banking
sectors,  and  enhances  government  credibility. In short,  we suggest  that the
true  moral  hazard  la  not  that  the government  will create  expectations  of
future  government  intervention  in a  market  economy  by  taking  responsibility
for  enterprise  obligations  to banks  incurred  under  socialism,  but rather,  that
the failure  to break  explicitly  with  the  past  will force  governments  to
intervene  on an ad hoc  basis  after  rejecting  intervention,  thereby  reducing
credibility  and  creating  expectations  of  more interventions.
Our assessment  then turns  to the fiscal  consequenc-e.  We explore  the
circumstances  under  which  explicit  government  assumption  of enterprise
obligations  to banks  causes  an increase  in  the  present  value  of the
government's  domestic  debt.  Then,  we empirically  address  the  questions  What
does the  extra  growth  rate  in  the  economy  have  to be in  order  to pay-off  any
extra fiscal  burden  from  the  government  assuming  enterprise  debts?  We
conclude  that (1)  the  additional  fiscal  burden  in  expected  present  value  terms
is likely  to be small (and  there  might  even  be net  fiscal  advantages)  and (2)
the  efficiency  gains  necessary  to satisfy  the  additional  fiscal  burden  - even
under  very  pessimistic  assumptions  - seem  very  small.
II.  A  POLICY  CHOICE
In formerly  socialist  economies  that  are  engaged  in the  transition  to market
economies,  policy  makers  must  make  a policy  choice:  governments  must define
the asset  and  liability  structure  of the  enterprises  and  banks  to be
privatized.
In  making  the  transition,  policy  makers  in  TSEs  are  attempting  to use  existing
asset  and  liability  structures. 3 This  means  that  enterprises  that received
bank  loans  under  socialism  will  retain  these  liabilities  when  the  government
privatizes  them.  Similarly,  banks  tha4-  made loans  under  socialism  will retain
these  assets  on their  balance  sheets.
An alternative  way  to arrange  the  assets  and  liabilities  of enterprises  and
banks  in  the  move  toward  a  market  economy  is  to  define  enterprises  as  free  of
bank  debt  and  replace  bank  assets  with  government  securities. In  this  paper,
As we  will  discuss  below,  many privatizations  achieved  thus far  in
Eastern  Europe  have  involved  government  assumption  of existing  bank  debt.3
we primarily  examine  these  two  extreme  ways of specifying  the asset  nd
liability  structure  of banks  and  enterprises  that  are  to be privatized,  i.e.,
with historic  bank-enterprise  obligations  intact,  or with  enterprise
obligations  to banks  replaced  with  government  securities. In  practice,  of
course,  countries  may  choose  many  ways  of allocating  the  assets  and
liabilities  of the  official  sector  as they  make  the  transition  to
predominantly  privately--wned,  market  economies. In  the  conclusion  section,
we briefly  discuss  other  asset  and  liability  structures. 4
To gain some  perspective  on this  policy  choice,  we find  it  helpful  to think  of
a socialist  economy  as  divided  into  tso  sectors;  the  official  sector  and
households. The consolidated  balance  sheet  of the  official  s3ctor  is composed
of enterprise,  bank,  and fiscal  accounts. Besides  land,  the  primary  domestic
assets  of the  official  sector  are  the  physical  capital,  buildings,  and
intangible  institutional  capital  of enterprises  and  banks. The  primary
domestic  liabilities  of the  official  sector  are  the  deposits  oi households.
The financial  obligations  within  the  official  sector  - among  the  government,
enterprises,  and  banks  - may  be very  complicated,  but  this  of course  does  not
alter  the  balance  sheet  of the  official  aector  taken  as a  whole.  Importantly,
enterprise  obligations  to banks  are  intra-official  sector  obligations.
Therefore,  rearranging  the  assets  and  liabilities  of entities  within  the
official  sector  cannot  alter  the  official  sector's  balance  sheet.
At first  glance  the  assignment  of assets  and liabilities  to the components  of
the official  sector  may  appear  a static  and  unimportant  accounting  exercise.
This paper,  however,  argues  that  this  assignment  has important  implications
for  the speed  and  efficiency  of privatization,  the  development  of a healthy,
efficient  financial  system,  and  the  economy's  dynamic  response  to
liberalization.  Thus,  the  way in  which  authorities  cope  with  past debts  can
have  important  incentive  effects  that  will  affect  the rate  and sustainability
of economic  recovery  and long-run  growth.
We should  emphasize  the  very narrow  boundaries  of this  paper. This  paper  does
not  present  a  privatization  plan for  enterprises  or banks;  we simply  evaluate
the  attractiveness  of the  government  assuming  state-owned  enterprise  debts  to
state-owned  banks  at the  point  of privatization  under  alternative
4  This  paper  does  not  examine  the  question:  At what  point  in time  do we
draw the  line  on which  loans  the  government  assumes? We implicitly  assume
that  the  government  assumes  all loans  issued  by state-owned  banks  to state-
owned  enterprises  up to the  point  when  the  enterprise  is  privatized  or
liquidated. In  practice,  this  could  be modified.4
privatization  plans.  Similarly,  this  paper  doeu  not  propose  a  mechanism  for
restructuring  and liquidatinzi  state-owned  enterprises  or bankes  we simply
argue  that  TSEs should  ultJirately  privatize  much  of the  enterprise  and
financial  sectors  and  that  the  government's  decision  regarding  the  inherited
stock  of enterprise  debts  to banks  will affect  the  efficient  operation  of
firms  and  enterprises. Finally,  we believe  the  privatization  process  is
liely to occur  over  many years. Consequently,  we evaluate  the  implications
of the  government  explicitly  assuming  responsibility  for  the  bank debts  of An
enterprise  when  that enterprise  is  privatized  or the  government  cleaning  the
balance  sheet  of A bank when  that  bank is  privatized.
III.  IMPLICATIONS:  EFFICIENCY,  CREDIBILITY,  FINANCIAL  PERFORMANCE
We evaluate  the implications  of  choosing  to privatize  enterprises  with  and
without  debt obligations  to state-owned  banks. We use four  inter-related
criteria  but devote  particular  attention  to the financial  sector. The  outline
for  critiquing,  evaluating,  and  comparing  different  methods  of specifying  the
asset  and liability  structure  of banks  and  enterprises  is as follows:
(1)  enterprise  privatizatWon  and  efficiency;
(2)  government  credibility  and intervention;
(3)  financial  sector  performance,
(a)  privatization  of banks,
(b)  bank  operational  efficiency,
(c)  implementation  of effective  supervision,
(d)  financial  structure;  and
(4)  fiscal  stability.
Any  potential  choice  of the  asset  and  liability  structure  of banks  and
enterprises  should  be evaluated  in  the  context  of these  criteria. Since  in
many transitional  socialist  economies  the real  value  of productive  assets  is
typically  low  when evaluated  at  world  market  prices  and  many of these
countries  are  suffering  from  tremendous  disruptions  to  past international
trading  patterns  and large  changes  in  their  terms  of trade,  the  costs  inherent
in  the transition  are  monumental  and  no assignment  of assets  and  liabilities
will avoid  these  costs. Nonetheless,  the  choice  of the  asset  and  liability5
structure  of banks  and  enterprises  must  be made,  and  the  choice  will
importantly  influence  incentive.  and  thereby  affect  the  rate  of recovery.
The  next  three  suhsections  compare  the  two  methods  of distributing  assets  and
liabilities  in  terms  of (1)  enterprise  priVatization  and  efficiency,  (2)
government  credibility  and  intervention,  and (3)  financial  sector  performance.
Based  on  these  criteria  alone,  we conclude  that  defining  enterpriass  as free
of bank  debt  at the  time of privatization  and  replacing  these  loans  on the
balance  shoet  of banks  with go-ornment  bonds  is  superior  to privatizing  with
historic  asset/liabilitv  obligations  intact. Section  IV  then  examines  the
fiscal  implications  of the  two  methods  of distributing  assets  and  liabilities.
We find  that  the fiscal  consequences  of the  government  explicitly  assuming
enterprise  obligations  to state-owned  banks  at the  time  oZ privatization  are
likely  to be much less  than  analysts  typically  assume.
A. Enterprise  Privatization  and  Efficiency
Attempting  to preserve  historic  bank-enterprise  obligations  may delay,
politicize,  and  ultimately  jeopardize  the  privatization  process. Domestic  and
foreign  investors  coi.cemplating  the  purchase  of enterprises  will have
incentives  to lobby  the  government  to assume  responsibility  for  past  debts.
Enterprises  and  banks  will  have similar  incentives  when the  government  plans
to privatize  enterprises  by distributing  their  shares  to the  public. This  may
produce  case-by-case  government  involvement  in  enterprise  debt  management  and
introduce  delays  and  uncertainty  into  the  privatization  process. Scarce
resources  will  be spent  evaluating  the  implications  and  value  of old  debts,
and  in lobbying  government  officials. Furthermore,  the  added  uncertainty  will
tend  to dissuade  some  potential  purchasers,  and  may lower  the price  that
others  are  willing  to pay.
Defining  enterprises  as free  of bank  debt  will simplify  the  evaluations  that
are  a pre-requisite  to privatization.  The  impetus  to lobby  the  government  to
assume  responsibility  for  past  debts  is eliminated,  and  pricing  enterprises
will  be subject  to less  risk.  This  should  expedite  privatization  and  the
realizasion  of the  efficiency  gains  expected  to be derived  from  privatization.
If  gover;%vents  privatize  enterprises  with their  historic  debt  obligations
intact,  some  fraction  of existing  enterprise.  that  would  otherwise  survive  and
prosper  will fail  because  of their  inability  to  meet inherited  debt  service
obligations.  Thus,  some  enterprises  will  undergo  the  costly  and inefficient6
process  of bankruptcy  simply  because  policy  makers  have  chosen  to define
"enterprises"  in  the  world  after  socialism  as including  past  bank debts.  If
instead  governments  assume  paot  debts  when  privatizing  enterprises,  there  will
be fewer  unnecoesary  bankruptcieu,  which  should  enhance  economic  efficiency
and  minimize  unemployment  and  other  transitional  costs. 5
Firms  free  of bank  cabt  will  have  more  retained  earnings  than firms  with  thoir
historic  debt  obligations. Since  much  of investment  is financed  through
retained  earnings  (which  mav  be a partizularly  important  source  of capltal
during  transition),  putting  more  capital  resources  directly  under  the  control
of firms  may increase  investment  and  efficiency. It is  worth  noting  that  the
advantages  of putting  more  retained  earnings  directly  under  the  control  of
newly  privatized  firms  would  not  occur  if  the  government  were to guarantee  the
loans  instead  of explicitly  assuming  total  responsibility  for  the loans.
Defining  firms  as free  of bank  debt  may also increase  the flow  of external
fLnancing  and improve  corporate  governance. Potential  encumbrances  on real
assets  ariaing  from inherited  debts  would  be eliminated,  facilitating  the flow
of new secured  lending  by banks  and  other  creditors. In addition,  firms  that
are sold  free  of bank  debt  will fetch  a higher  price  in  the  market,  which  may
increase  the stake  and interest  of new  owners  in  the firm's  long-run  success.
Thus,  choosing  to privatize  enterprises  free  of bank  debt should  accelerate
privatization,  enhance  the  viability  of enterprises  and increase  the  flow  and
efficiency  of investment  financing,  thereby  inducing  a faster  transformation
with lower  adjustment  costs.
B. Government  Credibility  and  Intervention
Examples  from  around  the  globe  suggest  that reductions  in government
credibility  can  raise  uncertainty,  increase  interest  rates,  and jeopardize  the
suzcessful  implementation  of policy  reforms. Choosing  to privatize
enterprises  free  of bank  debts  incurred  under  socialism  may improve  government
5  Eliminating  the  debt  burden  of enterprises  may give  new life  to "bad"
firms,  perhaps  prompting  new lending  by banks  not  yet able  to identify  non-
viable  firms. This  will  undoubtedly  be a part  of learning  to operate  in  a
market  economy. But,  to the  extent  that  old  relationships  between  state-owned
banks  and  state-owned  enterprises  continues  to strongly  influence  loan
decisions  once  the  government  privatizes  enterprises,  it  may  be particularly
important  for  the  government  to privatize  banks  to reduce  the importance  of
hiotoric,  political  obligations  in  credit  allocation.7
credibility. Put  simply,  "better  to do so now  with credibility  then later
with lost  credibility"  (See  Appendix  1  for a  brief  discussion  of alternative
approaches  to the "E  d" debt problem.).
Policy  makers  who choose  to enter  the  transitional  phase  to a  ma=ket  economy
with  historic  asset/liability  arrangements  intact  risk  institutionalizing  ad
hoc  government  intervention  in  f.hat  iu Rupposed  to  be the  now  private  sector.
Experience  suggests  that in  many instances  the  government  will  ult 4 mat*ly
asuume  past debts  to facilitate  the  privatization  process,  avoid  wide-spread
bankruptcy,  and  promote  a healthy  financial  sector. With more  privatized
firms  likely  to be unprofitable  when  burdened  with  past  debt,  the stage  is set
for  subsequent  government  bailouts,  subsidized  loans,  and  poorly  designed
directed  credit  schemes. The  motivations  for  these  interventions  may  be based
on political  considerations  with little  regard  for  economic  efficiency  or long
run  government  credibility,  and  these  interventions  are  likely  to occux  under
crisis  conditions.
The  governments  of formerly  socialist  countries  generally  agree  on the  rAed  to
establish  a  break  with the  historic  pattern  of wLdespread  involvement  in
economic  activity. Defining  assets  and liabilities  such  that enterprises  are
free  of bank debt  and  banks  are solvent  represents  a  more credible  break  with
the  past.  This  policy  choice  may reduce  pressures  for,  and  expectations  of,
government  intervention  and special  favors,  circumventing  the progressively
corrosive  effect  of the  government  assuming  or guaranteeing  debt  after
publicly  asserting  that it  will not  intervene. Furthermore,  these  effects
would  reduce  overall  uncertainty  in  the  economy  and  potentially  lower  the  risk
premium  component  of interest  rates.8
C. Financial  Sector  Performance
Using  the  historic  asset/liability  structure,  most of the  banking  systems  in
tr~aisitional  socialist  economies  are insolvonta  the  market  value  of old  debts
is  typically  much lower  than  the  deposits  of households. The insolvency  of
the  banking  system  creates  a number  of problems  that inhibit  the ability  of
the financial  system  to mobilize  savlngs  and  allocato  resources  effectively.
Specifically,  using  the inherited  asset/liability  structurp  hinders  the
privatization  of banks,  the  efficient  operation  of banks,  the  adoption  of
sound  regulatory  po'icies  and  bank supervision,  and  the  develcopmnt  of a sound
financial  structure. Redefining  assets  and  liabilities  so that  banks'  claims
on enterprises  are  eliminated  helps  to  overcome  these  obstacles.
1.  Privatization  of Banks
We see  privatization  of the  banking  system  as a desirable  goal. 6
Privatization  will enhance  competition  and improve  incentivtis.  Increased
competition  and  the  profit  motive  should  stimulate  improvements  in personnel
and  skills,  physical  capital,  and  the  overall  efficiency  of bank operations.
Besides  improving  the 'production  function"  of banks,  privately  held  banks
should  be less  prone  to political  manipulation  than publicly  held  banks.?
A critical  consequence  of redefining  claims  within  the  official  sector  to
extinguish  all  pre-transition  claims  by banks  on enterprises  is that it sets
the stage  for  a  more rapid  and  succedeful  privatization  of banks. Eliminating
enterprise  obligations  to banks  makes  privatization  more  feasible  because
potential  purchasers  can  value  assets  more easily  and  with  greater  precision,
and  because  extinguishing  "bad"  debts  enhances  the  capacity  of banks  to
operate  profitably. Privatization  in this  manner  is likely  to prove  more
lasting,  in that  the  government  can  credibly  argue  that it  has  no
responsibility  for losses  the  banks  may incur  in  the future. Clean  banks  can
be sold  to foreign  and  domestic  investors  without  future  recourse  to the
6-
6  We do not  believe  that  complete  privatization  will  or should  occur
quickly  in  one "big  bang." We do,  however,  believe  the  process  should  atart
soon,  even if  the initial  efforts  are  very small.
7  In t e context  of a long-run  privatization  process,  the  government  may
wish  to privatize  a bank  or  part  of a  bank  before  the  government  privatizes
all  the  enterprises  to  which  the  ban- has  issued  loans. In such  a case,  the
government  could  substitute  governme.-  bonds  for  the  loans  to  state-owned
enterpris'  t  on  the  balance  sheet  of  the  bank  and  move  the  loans  to  another
l'ate-owr  bank.9
government. Absent  the old  loans,  i.nventors  will likely  see  considerable
value  in  the  banks,  physical  facilities,  funding  bass,  trade  name,  account
relationships,  and  staff. Banks  might  be sold  at a  multiple  of  tangible  book
value.
tn  contrast,  by preserving  the  claims  by banks  on enterprises,  the  prospects
for  the  privetization  of the  3minant  banks  seem  remote. Pri";atization  could
be attempted  oy eithar  selling  the  banks  or g-iving  them  to the public. Non-
recourse  sale  to informed  purchasers  is  highly  unlikely  given  the
uncertainties  regarding  the  banks'  assets,  and  their  consequent  negative  net
worth. Giving  banks  to the  public  does  not relteve  ths  government  of its
responsibUlity  tor  dealing  with  the insolvency  of the  banks,  and  thus  cannot
be considered  as genuine  privatization. If the  banks  are  deemed  by the  publlc
to have  negative  net  present  value,  the  owners  may simply  let  the  banks  go
bankrupt. Faced  wlth imminent  bankruptcy  and  the possible  collapse  of the
monetary  and  payments  system,  the  government  would  be likely  to assume
responsLbility  for  the  deposits  and  perhaps  re-natLonalLie  the  banks.  In
fact,  with little  capital  at risk  and  with lLabilitLis  seen  as guaranteed  by
the  government,  managers  would  have  few lncentlves  not  to engage  ln rLsky
ventures,  llkely  magnifying  the  dep  is of lnsolvency  wlth  which  the  government
eventually  wlll  have  to deal.
PrivatLzatLon  brought  about  by extinguishlng  all  pra-transition  "laimt  offers
advantages  over  the alternative  of granting  an expllcit  guarantee  agaLnst
losses  on those  claims. Providing  a guarantee  requLres  a  valuatlon  of the
assets  in  order  to establish  some  limit  on the  extent  of the  protection. By
extinguishing  the  claims,  not  only  would  the  scope,  length  and  cost  of the  due
diligence  and  negotiation  processes  be reduced,  but  the  government  would  avoid
additional  costs  arising  from  uncertaLnties  regarding  the adequacy  of the
guarantee. The  purchaser  nay  underprice  the  guarantee  due to uncertainties
regarding  the  accuracy  of its  asset  valuations,  the  permanence  of the
guarantee  under  successive  regimes,  and  the long  run  financial  capacity  of the
government.
. Bank  Ooerationa;  Efficiencv
The largest  effect  on financial  efficiency  will  derive  from  the  ability  to
privatize  banks.  Senior  managers  of  privately  owned  banks  would  strlve  for
job  security  and  financLal  reward  by improving  the  bank's  financial
performance. Privately  owned  banks  would  have  incentives  to seek  out10
profitable  lending  opportunities,  and  would  more  rapidly  develop -he  capacity
to distinguish  between  good and  bad  borrowers. They  would  be more likely  to
resist  lending  to existing,  non-viable  borrowers. The improvement  in
financial  efficiency  will have  correspondingly  positive  effects  on enterprise
efficiency.
In addition  to  the financial  constraint  to privatization  arising  from
uncertainties  regarding  the losses  inherent  in  the  historic  claims,  the  task
of resolving  those  claims  places  a substantial  burden  on human  resources  and
serves  as an added  impediment  to privatization.  New  owners  need  to reorient
management  and  staff  toward  market-based,  sound,  and  profitable  operations  as
soon  as possible. If  privatized  along  with  the old  claims,  with the  exception
of some  asset  resolution  skills,  many of the  resources  expended  in the  work-
out  of those  claims  will  provide  little  long  term  benefit  to the  banks. The
reorientation  of management  and  staff,  which  must be considered  fundamentally
important  to operational  efficiency,  likely  will be deferred  and  misdirected.
In  the  extreme,  the  allocation  of very  limited  human  resources  to this  task
could  threaten  the long  run  viability  of a bank in  a competitive  market.
Redefining  the  banks  as initially  free  of claims  on enterprises  would  permit
owners  and  managers  to assemble  and  train  th',  staff  necessary  to operate
effectively  in  a market  economy. Existing  managers  and  staff  whom  would
otherwise  have  to be retained  to participate  in  the  process  of resolving  the
old claims  can  be replaced.  Human  resources  could  be redirected  toward
developing  business  plans,  establishing  mound  credit  granting  and  risk
management  processes,  and installing  controls  and  processes. External
technical  assistance  could  be similarly  redirected.
As previoualy  noted,  the  redefinition  of the  banks'  assets  would  facilitate
the  evaluation  of firms  and  remove  potential  encumbrances  on enterprise
assets,  both  of  which  should  lower  intermediation  costs. In addition,  past
loans  are  currently  distorting  credit  allocation.  Banks  are issuing  credit  t-
troubled  firms  to help  them service  old  debts  and  pay  wages.  If  debts
incurred  under  socialism  were  eliminated,  banks  would  have  less incentive  to
finance  inefficient  enterprises. Thus,  choosing  to define  enterprises  as
debt-free  would  expedite  the allocation  of credit  to  more productive  uses and
encourage  banks  to more  aggressively  seek-out  new  businese  relationships.
Efficiency  gains  in  the financial  sector,  coupled  with  the improved  integrity
of government  and  banks,  should  have  beneficial  consequences  for  the
enterprise  sector. Not  only should  overall  borrowing  costs  be lower,  but  as12
banks  improve  the'  skills  in  mobilizing  resources  and  alloca'lng  capital  to
the  most  productive  sectors,  the  overall  efficiency  of the  enterprise  sector
will improve.
3. implementation  of Bank  Supervision
A key  objective  of bank supervisors  is  to provide  reasonable  assurance  that
capital  is commensurate  with risk,  such  that  the amount  of capital  is
sufficient  to absorb  potential  future  losses  in  individual  banks  and  the
system  as  a whole. To achieve  capital  adequacy,  supervisors  utillze  various
methodologies,  most  of which  are  built  around  a system  of prudential
regulation  designed  to limit  risks  and  ensure  a certain  level  of reserves  and
capital.
By attempting  to preserve  the  historical  claims  of banks  on enterprises,
capital  adequacy  has  no significance  for  the  bulk  of the  banking  system,  as
losses  assocJated  with  these  claims  exceed  the  capital  bases  of the  major
banks  by several  multiples. Absent  continuing  government  support,  directors
and  managers  of these  banks  have  no realistic  means  by whlch  to establish
adequate  reserves  and  capital. Further,  they  have little  incentive  to adhere
to prudential  rules,  which  in  many  co-es  define  and limit  risk  exposures  in
terms  of capital,  and supervisors  have  little  capacity  to enforce  them.
Supervisors  may  respond  by establishing  two sets  of prudential  regulations,
one for  new  private  banks,  and  another  for  the  dominant  state-owned
institutions.  A two tier  system  of  supervision  not  only  compromises  the
integrity  of  supervisors,  who  should  be  perceived  as  immune  to  the  influence
of  political  expediency,  but  supervisors  may  find  it  more  difficult  to  develop
and  administer  the  two  tier  system,  contributing  to delays  in  implementation.
Partially  as  a  result,  in  many instances  not  only  the  dominant  state-owned
banks  but  also  the  growing  number  of  small  privately  held  banks  are  operating
without  clear  and  comprehensive  guidance  regarding  the  rules  of banking  and
without  regulatory  oversight.
Eliminating  claims  by banks  on enterprises  will  substantially  reduce  the
uncertainty  regarding  existing  loan  portfolios. Therefore,  supervisors  and
managers  can  more readily  determine  and  achieve  an appropriate  level  of12
reserves  and  capital. Furthermore,  prudential  rules,  most importantly  the
capital  standard,  become  more relevant  and  potentially  enforceable. 8
4.  Financial  Structure
Transfer  of the commercial  operations  of central  banks  into  new  entities  that
now  comprise  the  bulk of  the commercial  banking  system  often  produced  a
segmented  and  non-competitive  structure.  While  the  deficiencies  of the
resulting  structures  are  generally  understood,  reconfiguration  of the
structures  often  is  viewed  as  prohibitively  formidable. one  argument  for
maintaining  the status  quo is  that  centralized  headquarters  functions  and
existing  staffs  are  necessary  to facilitate  the substantial  interactions
between  the  banks,  governments  and  enterprises  that  will  be required  to
negotiate  the  workout  of all  the  historic  claims.
Elimination  of the historic  claims  by banks  on enterprises  may create  a
temporary  period  of greater  flexibility  regarding  both  the  organizational  and
asset  structures  of  the dominant  banks. Redefining  the  claims  within  the
official  sector  so  that  banks'  claims  on enterprises  are  extinguished
eliminates  the need  for  the  workout  process  and  establishes  an environment
ripe  for  new lending  and  financial  arrangements.  The  need  to retain  the
existing  structure  and  staff  is  reduced,  and flexibility  to alter  the
organization,  management  and  staff  of the  banks  is increased. Replacing
claims  on er-terprxses  with claims  on the  government  would  substantially
simplify  banks'  assets  structures.  Such  simplification  would  facilitate  the
redistribution  of assets,  allowing  the  creation  of smaller  banks,  along  more
rationale  lines,  facilitating  privatization  and  promoting  competition.
IV.  FISCAL  IMPLICATIONS
In  the  preceding  section  we conclude  that  defining  enterprises  as free  of bank
debt  at the  time  of privatization  and  replacing  these  loans  on the  balance
sheet  of banks  with  government  bi Is  has  numerous  advantages  over  privatizing
8  One  may  argue  that  private  banks  should  not  be  allowed  to  operate
without  sufficient  capital  at  risk  and  without  sufficient  regulation.  Thus,
strict  licensing  procedures  linked  to  regulatory  capacity  is  crucial,  and
capital  requirements,  commensurate  with  the  very  risky  environment,  should  be
set  significantly  higher  than  8  percent.13
with historic  asset/liability  obligations  intact  when  using  the  criteria  of
economic  and  financial  performance  and  government  credibility. This section
compares  and  contrasts  the fiscal  implications  of (1)  privatizing  enterl,riues
after  explicitly  assuming  all  debts  owed  by enterprises  to state-owned  banks
with (2)  privatizing  enterprises  without  assuming  the  debts.  By fiscal
implications  we mean the incremental  resources  that have  to be raised  through
taxation. For  purposes  of simplicity,  we equate  the  present  value  of those
fiscal  revenue  raising  requirements  to the implied  increase  in the  outstanding
stock  of government  obligations. Resources  th t accrue  indirectly  to the
government  from  enterprises  paying  off  debts  to state-owned  banks  are  not
considered  taxation. Furthermore,  we note  that  sales  of enterprises  and  banks
by the  government  to the  private  sector  reduce  the  net stock  of domestic
government  debt obligations.
To isolate  the  channels  through  which  privatization  may affect  taxation
requirements  we first  consider  the  case  when  enterprise  privatization  is
accomplished  by selling  the  enterprises  to the  private  sector. These  sales
may be to individuals,  mutual  funds,  or private  firms,  and  may be to foreign
or domestic  investors. The important  characteristic  is that  agents  who are
outside  of the official  sector  will  purchase  enterprises  owned  by entities
within  the official  sector.
We then  examine  the  case  when  enterprise  privatization  is  accomplished  by
livina  enterprises  to the public. This  may  occur  by simply  distributing
shares  to households,  creating  mutual  funds  held  by households  and
distributing  enterprise  shares  to the  funds,  or  by allowing  individuals  to
purchase  vouchers  for  a nominal  fee  and  then  to  bid for  ownership  of
enterprises  with these  vouchers. The  important  characteristic  is that
ownership  of enterprises  is  transferred  to the  private  sector  without  having
the  private  sector  purchase  the  enterprises  at anything  close  to market
determined  prices.
Although  this  dichotomy  may not  apply  to any  particular  economy,  the  analysis
provides  a simple  analytical  framework  for  examining  the fiscal  implications
of combinations  of different  privatization  schemes  and  different  schemes  to
cope  with  the  bad debt  problem.14
A. lglina  Enterprises
We begin  the  analysis  with a  benchmark  came.  Consider  a privatisation  schme
where  by all  enterprises  are sold  on one day.  Under  theme  conditions  there
are  only  very  minor  differences  in  the fiscal  situation  between  the  government
assuming  the  debt  prior  to  privatization  or the  government  not  assuming  the
debt.
Consider  first  the  example  of a  viable  firm,  a firm  where  the  expocted  present
value (EPV)  of assets  plus  revenues  minus  operating  costs  exceds  the book
value  of debt.  Let  debt  equal  50 and  th  EPV  of assets  plus  revenues  less
operating  costs  equal  100.  Under  some  standard  simplifying  assumptions,  the
government  receives  50 for  the  firm  if the  government  does  not assume  the
debt,  and  the  government  receives  100  but  inaurs  additional  debt  of 50 for  a
net  receipt  of 50 if the  government  assumes  the  debt.  Thus,  in  the case  of a
viable  firm,  the  government  decision  to sell  the  enterprise  with  or without
past  debt  obligations  will not  much affect  the fiscal  situation.
Now  consider  the  more complicated  example  of a "non-viable"  firm  whose  EPV i
lese  than  the  book value  of debt  obligations,  and first  consider  the case  when
the  government  does  not  assume  responsibility  of enterprise  debts. Let  the
book  value  of bank loane  equal  150,  and  the  EPV  of assets  plus revenues  minus
operating  costs  equal  50.  Thus,  the  EPV  of the  firm including  the book  value
of debt  obligations  is -100.  Because  of the  implications  of limited
liability,  it seems  reasonable  to assume  that  a government  selling  this
enterprise  could  receive  a positive  price  since  investors  might  be willing  to
pay something  for  the "option  value"  that  the  firm  will  do very  well.
Nonetheless,  the "average"  non-viable  firm  will  go bankrupt  and  default  on 100
of its  bank loans. 9 Since  the  government  owns  the banks,  the  EPV  of the
additional  government  obligations  associated  with the  average  non-viable  firm,
when  the  government  does  not  assume  responsibility  for  enterprise  debts,  is
100,  the amount  of the "bad"  loans. These  obligations,  however,  may  not  be
recognized  explicitly  in  the fiscal  accounts  for  some  time.
On the  other  hand,  if  the  government  assumes  loans  with  book  value  of 150  when
the firm  is  privatized,  the  government  would  receive  approximately  50 for
selling  the firm,  so that  the  government's  obligations  would  immediately  rise
9  Of course,  owners  of some firms  may "steal"  the assets  first  and  then
go bankrupt,  leaving  a bigger  bank  debt loss. Worse,  some  owners  may  acquire
still  more  debt before  going  bankrupt. Alternatively,  some firms  may succeed
and  pay-off  completely  their  bank  de?tt.15
in present  value  terms  by 100. While  this is  the same  as  the EPV  when the
government  does not  assume  the  debt,  these  obligations  are  explicitly
recognized  in fiscal  accounts  immediately. 10 Thus,  explicit  assumption  of
state-owned  enterprise  debts  to state-owned  banks  when the  government
privatizes  the enterprise  will  not  alter  the  EPV of fiscal  obligations  by
much,  but in the  short-run,  the fiscal  accounts  may deteriorate.
B.  Givina  Firms  to The Private  Sector'l
Again  let's  consider  the  simple  benchmark  case  where  all  enterprises  are  given
away  on one  day.  Similarly  let's  first  consider  a viable  firm  with debts  of
50 and  EPV  of assets  plus  revenues  minus  operating  costs  of 100.  If the
government  privatizes  the firm  with its  debt  obligations,  the government's
obligations  do not  rise  and  the  average  firm  of this  type  will repay  the loan.
if instead  the government  assumes  the  debt,  its  obligations  rise  by 50.  Thus,
in  those  cases  where firms  can satisfy  their  debt  obligations  - let's  call
these  "good"  loans,  the fiscal  situation  is  worse  when the  government
explicitly  assumes  enterprise  debt  than  when the  government  does  not  assume
the debt.  Specifically,  government  obligations  increase  by an amount  equal  to
the  size  of the "good"  loans,  and  this  increase  is recognized  in  the fiscal
account  immediately.  We should  also  recognize,  however,  that  taxable  wealth
in  the  private  also increase  one-for-one  with the  government  assumption  of
"good"  loans.
Now  consider  a non-viable  firm  with  debts  of 150  and  EPV  of assets  plus
revenues  minus  operating  costs  of 50.  In terms  of expected  value  then,  50 of
the 150  in loans  are "good",  while  100  are "bad". In  this  case,  if  the firm
is  given  to the public  with  the  debts  intact,  the  expected  debt repayment
equals  50,  so that  the  government  ultimately  expects  its  obligations  to rise
by 100  in present  value  terms  But  the increase  in  government  obligations  may
not  be recognized  explicitly  in  the fiscal  account  for  some  time.
10  There  will  be fewer  bankruptcies  if the  government  assumes  debts
explicitly  at the  point  of privatization. Since  bankruptcy  has  both
efficiency  costs  and  bureaucratic  costs,  explicit  assumption  of enterprise
debts  will  reduce  fiscal  expenditures  and  the  burdens  on the  bankruptcy
courts.
11  We exaggerate  the fiscal  costs  in  this section  because  firms  may not
be simply  given  to the  public. Some  privatization  plans  require  that  private
individuals  pay a fee  to participate  in the  privatization  process.16
In the case where the government aesumes the debts prior to privatisition,
government obligations rise by 150, and are reflected immediately in the
fiscal accounts.  In comparison with the came where the government does not
assume the debt immediately, the fiscal situation is worse by 50, equal to the
size of the "good" loans.
While assumption of the debts prior to giving away viable and non-viable firms
increases government obligations by the amount of the "good" loans, this
action increases the wealth of the domestic private sector by a corresponding
amount.  This increase in wealth can conceivably be taxed to service the
increase in government obligations.  Also, explicit assumption of enterprise
debts would reduce enterprise bankruptcy, which would reduce government
expenditures on unemployment and other social safety net obligations.
C. SynoDRis of Fiscal implications
1. Concetual
Our simplified analytical framework suggests that when selling enterprises,
there may be  only minor differences in the EPV of the fiscal situation between
the government assuming or not assuming all enterprise obligations to banks.
When giving enterprises to the domestic private sector, the fiscal situation
could be significantly worse when the government assumes enterprise debts.
Specifically, if the government assumes the loans prior to privatization, the
fiscal situation deteriorates by the size of the "good" loans, loans that
would otherwise be repaid to government-owned banks.  But since the assumption
of the good loans increases private sector wealth by a corresponding amount,
the deterioration in the fiscal situation can be mitigated if government taxes
this increase in wealth.
Whether selling enterprises or giving them away, perhaps the more operative
distinction in that when assuming the loans at privatization, the increased
stock of government obligations is explicitly recognized in the fiscal
accounts, whereas by not assuming the debt, the increase in government
obligations occurs over time as private firms fail and default on their
obligations to government-owned banks.  The EPV of these obligations (ignoring
incentive effects), however, is equivalent.
other factors will have a substantive influence on the fiscal situation.
First, when privatizing by sale, the fiscal situation may actually be better17
in  the  case  where  the  government  explicitly  assumes  enterprise  debtu  than in
the case  where  the  government  does  not  assume  these  obligations. Purchase
prices  could  rise  by  more than  the  extinguished  debt  due  to lower  evaluation
costs,  less  costs  involved  in lobbying  officials  to assume  respwnjibility  for
the  debt  on a case-by-case  manner,  and less  uncertainty  about  the
privati-etion  process  in  general. Indirectly,  lower  uncertainty,  lower
evaluation  costs,  and i.creased  government  credibility  may lower  real interest
rates,  further  increasing  prices  paid for  enterprises.
Second,  whether  by sale  or give-away,  banks  burdened  with portfolios  full  of
"bad"  loans  will  be impossible  to privatize. 12 Alternatively,  as  we argued
above,  banks  clear  of past bad loans  could  be privatized  more  easily  and
successfully.  Thus,  by explicitly  assuming  enterprise  debts,  fiscal  revenue
would  be increased  directly  by the  price  of the  banks,  and indirectly  because
the  government  would  not  have  to subsidize  inefficient,  loss-making,  state-
owned  banks.
Finally,  and  perhaps  most importantly,  the  more  rapid  privatization  of
enterprises  and  banks  made possible  by resolving  historical  debts,  and
efficiency  gains  inherent  in  not  having  to resolve  claims  inherited  from  the
previous  economic  system,  would  stimulate  economic  activity. Explicitly
assuming  enterprise  debts  would  thus lead  to larger  tax  receipts  at current
taxation  rates,  as  well as lower  unemployment  compensation  payments.
Our analysis  of the implications  for  the  present  value  of the  government's
obligations  has  been  conducted  assuming  that  the  government  assumes  past
enterprise  debts  at the  time  of privatization,  either  by sale  or give-away.
If the  government  assumes  the  debt  prior  to privatization,  government  debt
will rise  temporarily  because  the  government  will not  receive  the  higher  price
for  the firm  until  it sells  the firm,  resulting  in a potential  cash flow
deficiency. Also,  assuming  the  debts  prior  to  privatization  may  promote
further  accumulation  of debt.  Prior  to privatization  the historic
relationship  between  the  enterprise  and  the  bank  may remain  very strong.
There  may  be a tendency  for  firms  to accumulate  more debt  and  few incentives
for  banks  to deny  this credit. For  these  reasons,  waiting  until  the  time  at
which  firms  are  privatized  to assume  past  bank  debt has  some  merit.
12  We note  in Section  III  that  giving  away  banks  with  bad loans  cannot  be
viewed  as  genuine  privatization,  and  could  lead  to re-nationalization.18
2. Ouantitative
To gain some perspective on the potential trade-off between the efficiency
gains of the government explicitly assuming enterprise debts and the potential
fiscal costs, we address two empirical questions: (1)  What would the extra
growth rate in the economy have to be to pay-off the extra fiscal burden over
10 and 30 year horizons without changing the marginal tax rate; and (2)  What
is the extra fiscal burden the year after the government assumes all
enterprise debts?  To quantitatively assess these questions, we consider the
worst scenario for the fiscal accounts: giving enterprises to the public all
at once.
In Tables 1 and 2, we compute the extra real per annum GDP growth
necessary to pay for the extra fiscal burden of the government assuming state-
owned enterprise debts to state-owned banks under of a number of alternative
conditions.  In each Table we consider three enterprise debt to GDP ratios -
0.15, 0.30, and 0.45 - that potentially cover many of the situations in
central and eastern europe.  We also  consider  three assumptions regarding the
percentage of "good" debts, i.e., debts that would be paid in full by the
enterprises: 10%, 25%, and 50%, which also seem to cover the diversity of
circumstances in TSEs.  Thus, the present value of the extra fiscal burden of
the government assuming responsibility for all enterprise debts in a county
where 25% of the loans are "good" and the enterprise debt to GDP ratio is 0.30
is (0.30)*(0.25), or 7.5%  of GDP.
If we assume that the government completely pays this debt in 30 years,
then (under some simple assumptions specified in Appendix 2) Table 1 presents
the extra real per annum growth rate under the various assumptions.  Thus, for
example, if the enterprise debt to GDP ratio is 0.30 and 25% of loans are
"good," then the country would only have to grow an extra 0.06% per annum in
real terms, i.e., about one-twentieth of one percent extra growth, to generate
Bufficient tax revenues to satisfy the additional fiscal burden without
raising the marginal tax rate.  Table 2 presents the corresponding figures
when the period of amortization is 10 years.  Again using the example of an
enterprise debt to GDP ratio of 0.30 with 25% "good" loans, the required extra
growth (assuming no change in the marginal tax rate) is only 0.46% extra real
growth, i.e., less than one-half of one percent extra growth per year.
Table 3 focuses on the extra fiscal expenditures in 'he year following
the government assuming debt.  To compute extra fiscal expenditures next year
as a share of GDP next year, we multiply the ratio of extra government debt to
GDP by the nominal interest rate (to compute extra interest expenditures next
year) and we divide by one plus the growth rate of nominal GDP  (to  compute
nominal GDP next year).  Thus, using a nominal interest rate and nominal GDP19
growth  rate  of 23%  and  assuming  that  the  enterprise  debt  to GDP  ratio  is.  0.30
and  that 25%  of enterprise  loans  are  good,  we find  that  extra  government
expenditures  are 1.4%  of GDP.  The figures  in Table  3 exaggerate  the fiscal
burden  because  our computations  assume  that the fiscal  government  takes
responsibility  for  all  enterprise  debts  at once,  so that  the computed  extra
interest  payments  the  year following  government  assumption  of debt is ar large
as possible. If  the privatization  process  takeo  place  over  many  year.  and  the
fiscal  government  only assumes  enterprise  debts  at the  point  of  privatization,
the initial  fiscal  burden  will be smaller.
To us,  the  potential  additional  fiscal  costs  of the  government  explicitly
assuming  all  enterprise  debts  to state-owned  enterprises  when giving  the  firms
to the  private  sector  do not  seem large  in  comparison  with  potentially  very
large  efficiency  gains. More important  than  our interpretation  of those  rough
computations  is our  recommendation  that  analysts  should  attempt  to document
the  enterprise  and financial  sector  efficiency  effects,  examine  government
credibility  consequences,  and  quantify  any additional  fiscal  revenue  raising
implications  when evaluating  alternative  ways  of coping  with the  bad  debt
problem  in TSEs.
A  few  simple,  tentative  conclusions  emerge  from  our  analysis. First,  if  the
country  has chosen  to privatize  enterprises  by giving  them  away,  explicitly
assuming  loans  prior  to privatization  is  more attractive  the  larger  the "bad"
debt  problem. Explicitly  assuming  debts  has  the efficiency  effects  on the
enterprise  and financial  sector  discussed  above,  and  if the  bad  debt  problem
is large,  the  additional  fiacal  costs  (in  comparison  with  not  explicitly
assuming  the  debts  at privatization)  are  small. Second,  quantitatively,  the
fiscal  costs  of giving  firms  away  seem  small,  particularly  when  balanced
against  potentially  large  efficiency  gains. Third,  if the  country  chooses  to
privatize  enterprises  by selling  firms,  explicitly  assuming  enterprise  debts
to state-owned  banks  is particularly  attractive,  because  the  additional  fiocal
costs  are  small,  if not  negative  (a  positive  fiscal  consequence),  and  the
efficiency  gains  could  dramatically  help  the  transitiona'  process.
D. Bureaucratic  and  Political  Economy  Costs
There  are  certainly  bureaucratic  and  political  economy  costs  associated  with
the  government  assuming  enterprise  debts  explicitly  that  may  make  this  policy
choice  difficult. Most individuals  within  the  ofiicial  sector  are  not judged
on the  balance  sheet  of the  official  sector  as a  whole  or on the  efficiency  of20
the  entire  economy.  Individuals  are frequently  judged  on the  performance  of
their  agency  or sector. Thus,  shifting  resources  and  obligations  within  the
official  sector  may importantly  afEect  the  criteria  by which  individuals  are
evaluated  and  thereby  create  great  resistance  to altering  the asset  and
liability  structure  of entities  within  the  official  sector. This implies  that
government  assumption  of enterprise  obligations  may  be very costly  to
implement,  regardless  of its  potential  social  benefits. Therefore,  officials
responsible  for  the  country  as  a whole  may  need  to take  these  incentives  into
consideration  when considering  the implementation  of policies  that  cut across
entities  within  the  official  sector. Similarly,  hybrid  or compromise
approaches  may be able  to capture  most  of the  efficiency  gains  from  explicitly
assuming  debts  prior  to privatization,  while  circumventing  some  of  the
bureaucratic  problems  and  potential  fiscal  costs. 1 3
CONCLUSION
This  paper  focussed  on a decision  that  policy  makers  in TSEs  must  make:  how  to
define  the  asset  and  liability  structure  of enterprises  and  banks  as  they are
privatized.
Most  governments  are  attempting  to preserve  the  historic  structure  of claims
as  they  pursue  privatization. The  large  stock  of debts  incurred  under
socialism  and  the inability  of enterprises  to satisfy  these  debts  is impeding
privatization,  hindering  the  efficient  operation  of enterprises  and  banks,  and
harming  government  credibility  and  the  effectiveness  of reform  efforts. In
practice,  governments  often  assume  enterprise  debts  to banks  on a case-by-case
basis  in  order  to sell  enterprises  to _.Ite  private  sector. We argue  that  a
more  comprehensive  and  explicit  application  of such  a policy  would  enhance
efficiency  by do-politicizing  and  speeding  up the  privatization  process,
improving  the viability  and  profitability  of newly-privatized  enterprises,
increasing  government  credibility,  and  improving  the efficiency  of  the
financial  sector.
13  There  are  also  political  economy  influences  that favor  the  government
explicitly  assuming  enterprise  bank  debts.  For  example,  national  newspaper
headlines  in country  X that it  sold  company  Y for $300  million  may  produce
more support  for  the  government  than  selling  company  Y for  $50  million,  even
though  the  government  had  to assume  $250  million  worth  of bank  obligations  in
the  first  case.21
In our  analysis,  we focused  on the  financial  sector. We observe  that  TSEs
have  not  yet  privatized  major  banks,  and  we explain  that  privatizing  banks
will  tend  to augment  the efficiency  of financial  intermediation  and  the  speed
and  succeus  of the  transition. The  paper  contends  that  governments  are
unlikely  to succeed  in  privatizing  major  banks  unless  the  government  assumes
responsibility  for  a significant  portion  of  bank claims  on enterprizes.
Furthermore,  we  argue  that  the  operation  and  restructuring  of  state-owned
banks  will  be  enhanced  by  the  government  assuming  enterprise  debts.
Finally,  we examined  the  effects  on  the  fiscal  situation  of the  government
explicitly  assuming  enterprise  debts  to state-owned  banks  when the  government
privatizes  the  enterprises. Our  estimates  suggest  that  the fiscal
implications  are likely  to be small. Given (1)  the  potentially  large
efficiency  gains  from  the  government  assuming  enterprise  debts  and (2)  the
relatively  low  fiscal  costs,  we believe  governments  should  seriously  consider
assuming  enterprise  debts  to state-owned  banks  as they  privatize  enterprises.
One  way  to apply  some  of this  paper's  arguments  without  the  government
assuming  all  enterprise  debt is to  preserve  enterprise  debt obligations  to
banks  that are  of unquestioned  quality. Such loans  might  be those  that  are
rated  as "pass"  at detailed  loan  reviews  performed  with  the assistance  of
external  experts. Experience  in some  countries  suggests  that  such  loans  might
comprise  10%  to 20%  of outstanding  loan  portfolios.
A second  way  to apply  this  paper's  major  suggestions  is to preserve  those
claims  that  either  banks  or enterprises  themselves  agree  to preserve. This
type  of "self-selection"  would  be of particular  benefit  in  the  case  of
privatization  by distribution  of shares  because  it may  minimize  the increase
in  government  debt  while  maximizing  efficiency  gains. To accomplish  this,  it
may  be useful  to construct  some  form  of self-selection  mechanism  designedl  to
encourage  firms  to retain  liability  for  loans  that  can  be repaid.
In terms  of  multilateral  assistance  to TSEs,  explicit  assumption  of enterprise
debts  by the  government  at the  time  of privatization  would  shift  the focus
from  resolving  the inherited  bad  debt  problem  to supporting  the  efficient  flow
of resources  toward  productive  investment.  To promote  the  speed  with  which
newly  privatized  banks  assume  positive  roles  in  the  transition  process,
support  for  the  development  of fundamental  credit  processes  in  the dominant
banks  could  be intensified,  and  additional  resources  could  be devoted  to
rapidly  implementing  effective  bank  supervision.22
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Fischer,  Stanley  and  Alan  H. Gelb (1990)  "Issues  in  socialist  Economic  Reform"
PRE  Working  Paper,  No. 565.  The  World  Bank.
,  "The Process of Socialist Economic Transformation" The Journal  of
Economic  PersoectiveS,  5,  p. 91-106.
Gelb,  Alan  H. and  Cheryl  W. Gray (1991)  "The  Transformation  of Economies  in
Central  and  Eastern  Europe"  The  World  Banks  Policy  and  Research  Series,
17.
Hinds, M. "Economic  Effects  of Financial  Crises."  PRE  WPS  No. 104.
Long,  Millard  and Silvia  Sagari  (1991)  "Financial  Reform  in  Socialist
Economies  in  Transition"  PRE  Working  Paper,  No. 711,  The  World  Bank.
McKinnon,  Ronald  r.  (1991)  "Financial  Control  in  the  Transition  from  Classical
Socialism  to a  Market  Economy"  Journal  of Economic  Peragectives,  5,  p.
107-122.
Sheng,  Andrew  (1991)  "The  Art  of Bank  Restructuring:  Ilrues  and  Techniques"
EDI  Working  Paper,  The  World  Bank.
/E23
Appendix  I
Alternative  Acoroachbe  to the "Bad"  Debt  Problem
The  policy  options  for  coping  with a highly  insolvent,  publicly-owned  banking
sector  are  not  attractive. One  option  would  be to tax  the  deposits  of
households. This could  take  many  forms  from  simple  expropriation,  to
replacing  deposits  with less  valuable  instruments,  to inflation. Many
countries  have  explicitly  rejected  expropriation  of deposits  as a policy
alternative. In fact,  partial  expropriation  of deposits  does not  seem
advisable. It  would  jeopardize  the  monetary  system  because  of the size  of the
bad  loan  probleml  it  would  severely  affect  public  confidence;  and  thsre  do not
seem  to be good reaoons  to single  out  and  tax  deposit  holders  in  order  to
resolve  the  stock  of bad  debt incurred  under  central  planning. Controlling
deposit  interest  rates  and  inflating  away  the  value  of deposits  is another
mechanism  via  which  the  government  can  equilibrate  the  market  value  of bank
assets  and liabilities. Not  only  does  this suffer  from  the  problems  discussed
above,  but inflation  is  highly  distortionary  means  of taxation. Moreover,  in
countries  that  have  fixed  their  exchanige  rates  and  promised  to maintain
convertible  currencies,  inflation  would  cause  capital  outflows,  a loss  of
international  reserves,  induce  a devaluation,  and  perhaps  lower  government
credibility  because  of the  authorities  inability  to maintain  its  exchange  rate
policy.
The  other  option  frequently  considered  is  to replace  bad  bank assets  with good
ones.  One  mechanism  would  involve  restructuring  debt  into  an  equity  claim.
The  market  value  of the  enterprise  equity  would  have  to be close  to the  book
value  of the  debt to render  the  bank  solvent. While  this  could  be part  of the
approach  to resolving  the  problem  of highly  insolvent,  state-owned  banks  in
socialist  economies  in  transition,  debt-to-equity  restructuring  are  unlikely
to be the  major  solution  for  a number  of reasons. The  bad loan  situation  is24
very large,  and  the  pricing  of enterprises  is  both  extremely  costly  and
subject  to tremendous  uncertainty. Thus,  it  would  be  very expensive  and risky
to determine  the  correct  equity  share  due  banks  in  exchange  for  forgiving
existing  debts.  Furthermore,  it is  not  clear  that  these  countries  want to
begin  their  lives  as  market  economies  with  banks  owning  very large  shares  of
the  enterprise  sector.
The  other  way to replace  bad  bank  assets  with  goods  assets  is  to replace  bad
assets  with government-backed  assets  or reduce  government  claims  on banks.
These  government-backed  assets  could  be explicit  government  bonds,  government
guaranteed  mortgages,  or claims  on privatization  funds.14  The important
feature  is  that  the government  is  assuming  responsibility  for  bad loans.
It seems  to be unavoidable  that the  government  will  ultimately  (explicitly)
assume  responsibility  for  many  of the  bad  debts  that  were  incurred  under
central  planning.  5 Indeed,  global  experience  demonstrates  that  whenever  the
banking  sector  - particularly  state-owned  banks  - are  severely  insolvent,  the
replacement  of bad loans  with  government  bonds  is the  primary  way of resolving
the  banking  problem,  i.e.,  the  government  explicitly  assigne  fiscal  resources
to resolve  the banking  problem.
14  This  could  also involve  reduced  government  claims  on the  banks.
Is We emphasize  "explicitly"  because  as the  owner  of enterprises  and
banks,  the  government  already  has  responsibility  for  any losses.25
Appendix 2
Growth and Debt
This appendix specifies how we compute the rough estimates regarding how
much extra growth is needed to pay for extra fiscal debt.  Specifically, we
ask the following question: given ratio of state-owned enterprise debts to GDP
and assuming (1) a discount rate, (2)  a base line real GDP growth rate, (3)  a
tax rate, (4) a time period over which the debt and interest will paid, and
(S) a fraction of the debt considered to be "good" (i.e.,  debt that
enterprises would pay in full), what would be the extra rate of growth in the
economy necessary to pay-off the extra fiscal burden - the "good" debt - over
the given time horizon without changing the marginal tax rate.
Formally, let r =  the discount rate (we  assume 3%), g - the baseline
real GDP growth rate (we use 3%), t =  the tax rate (we  use 30%), D - the
initial enterprise debt to GDP ratio, f - the fraction of enterprise loans
considered good (assumptions given in Tables), T - the time horizon over which
the debts will be satisfied (assumption  given in the text), and e =  the extra
growth necessary to pay-off the additional fiscal responsibility, where the
additional fiscal responsibility equals f*D, and EPVt - the expected present
value of tax revenues (as a share of GDP) if the government does not assume
enterprise debts.
Thus, EPVt, the expected present value of tax revenues when the
government does not assume the debts is
EPVt  [  t  J  )
where individual time periods are indexed by i and the summation is done from
i - 1 to T.26
In  the case  when the  government  privatizes  enterprises  by distributing  shares
to the  public,  the fiscal  debt riLses  by f*D  more  when the  government
explicitly  assumes  enterprise  debts  to banks  than  if the  government  does  not
assume  these  debts  under  the  simplifying  assumptions  discussed  in  the  body  of
the  paper.  Thus,  if  the  tax rate  remains  constant,  the  economy  will have  to
grow  faster  to satisfy  these  additional  obligations. Mathematically  to find
the  additional  growth,  we must computed  es
EPVt+f*D  t(1+g+e)J, 
where  individual  time  periods  are indexed  by i  and the  summation  is  done from
i  =  1  to T.27
TADLE  1
Extra  Real  GDP  Growth  Per  Annum
Amortization  Period  of Government  Debt:  30 Years
Enterprise  Debt/GDP:  0.15  0.30  0.45
Percent  "Good"
10%  0.01%  0.02%  0.03%
25%  0.03%  0.06%  0.08%
50%  0.06%  0.11%  0.16%
TABLE  2
Extra  Real  GDP  Growth  Per Annum
Amortization  Period  of Government  Debts  10 Years
Enterprise  Debt/GDP:  0.15  0.30  0.45
Percent  "Good"
10%  0.09%  0.19%  0.28%
25%  0.23%  0.46%  0.69%
50%  0.46%  0.91%  1.35%
TABL  3
Extra  Interest  Expenditures  Next  Year
(Percent  of Next  Year's  GDP)
Enterprise  Debt/GDP:  0.,.S  0.30  0.45
Percent  "Good"
10%  0.28%  0.56%  0.84%
25%  0.70%  1.40%  2.10%
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